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Abstract. An analysis of risks related to controlled
process and related hazards identification is an impor-
tant activity during the development of the safety re-
lated control system (SRCS). The mistake of the oper-
ational staff during the execution of the safety relevant
operations related to controlled process can be the cause
of hazard. Influence of the operator on controlled pro-
cess safety depends on operation mode of the SRCS and
on technical safety of the SRCS. This contribution deals
with the issue of the safety assessment of the operator
effect on the safety of the controlled process.
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1. Introduction
The SRCS is a technological device for controlling of
safety-critical process and its role is to replace or super-
vise a human (operator) in applying the safety-critical
operations related to control of the considered process.
The aim of such replacement or supervising is con-
tribute to safety of controlled process so that SRCS
eliminates human (operator) errors. So that SRCS is
a coupling device between the operator and controlled
process.
Functions of the SRCS can be divided into Fig. 1:
• control functions without influence on the safety;
it means functions the failure of which may cause
operational problems, but cannot endanger safety
of the controlled process,
• control functions with influence on the safety; it
means functions the failure of which may cause not
only operational problems, but can also endanger
the safety of the controlled process,
• protective functions; it means functions, which
do not participate on the process controlling, but
their role is to supervise the state of elements that
reduce the risk of damage to protected assets (peo-
ple, environment, property, ...) located in the
scope of controlled process.
Protective and controlled functions with influence on
the safety are referred as safety functions (SF). SRCS
can contain more safety functions; each safety func-
tion can be defined with different safety integrity level
(SIL) [6].
Fig. 1: Functions of the SRCS.
A specific position between SRCS functions have so-
called emergency functions (EF), which do not par-
ticipate on control of the process, but their role is to
minimize thread of the controlled process safety due to
operator error or failure of interface between the oper-
ator and SRCS (so-called Human-machine interface –
HMI) during emergency operation (the operation when
required safety function is not available). Due to the
failure of the HMI can occur to falsification (modifi-
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cation) of the operator’s command. That means the
failure of the HMI has the same impact on the safety
of controlled process as the operator’s error.
2. Error Rate of the Operator
It is very difficult task to evaluate reliability properties
of the operator, because the operator does not behave
always equally in the same situation. Moreover, the
same traffic situation can be successfully resolved in
many cases by the different ways. Human reliability
can be described by the analogous parameters such as
reliability of technical systems – human error proba-
bility (HEP), respectively probability of successful ex-
ecution of the operation (human success probability -
HSP).
There are used different methods in the world to
estimate the human error probability. The following
methods belong to the most frequently used methods
of probabilistic estimation of human reliability [8]:
• THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate Pre-
diction),
• SLIM (Success Likelihood Index Method),
• HRC (Human Cognitive Reliability),
• SHARP (Systematic Human Action Reliability
Procedure).
Human error probability depends on the operator‘s
behavior mode. Generally we can consider following
behavior modes of the operator [9], [10]:
• skill-based behavior mode,
• rule-based behavior mode,
• knowledge-based behavior mode.
There is no clear boundary between these behavior
modes and the operator usually combines individual
behavior modes.
To minimalize operator error probability means to
know causes of the errors occurring. The most frequent
causes of the operator’s error are:
• inattention,
• lack of the operator’s specialized skills,
• work overload or time pressure,
• bad management of the operator.
3. Modelling of the Operator
Effect on the Controlled
Process Safety
Operator influences controlled process through the
SRCS. Therefore influence of the operator on the safety
of the controlled process can be evaluated only provid-
ing knowledge of functional and technical properties of
the SRCS and knowledge of the operator’s role in the
controlled process. The operator role in the controlled
process we can describe using different models. It is
desirable to create each model so that describes spe-
cific monitored property and there should be respected
mutual relations between individual models.
3.1. Object Model
The object model (Fig. 2) illustrates static relations
between operator, SRCS and controlled process. The
observed property is influence of the operator to the
safety of the controlled process. For this reason there is
not presented object realised functions without safety
influence in the figure.
Ideally all commands to the controlled process state
change are generated by the logic of the SRCS base on
the state information on controlled process (informa-
tion from sensors) and base on operator’s commands.
SRCS accepts command from the operator only if can-
not the thread of controlled process safety occur and
the hazard can arise only due to failure of the safety
function (safety functions) of the SRCS. Tolerable in-
tensity of safety function malfunction can be deter-
mined based on risk analysis.
In the case of continuous operation control, there is
a need to ensure control the process by the operator
in the case of partial or total failure of the SRCS too.
The operator must supply safety functions which are
not available (non-functional functions) and therefore
must assume the responsibility for process control in
this case. Operator issues safety critical commands
based on state information of the controlled process,
commands control the actuators. The operator can
obtain state information of the process using HMI or
by direct process observation. The operator can control
actuators either directly or indirectly using emergency
function (EF) depending on technical solution of the
SRCS and depending on its failure range.
SRCS with safety functions with lover SIL (usually
SIL 1) enables to operator during the fault-free opera-
tion and during the emergency operation interfere with
process control without the check of his commands by
the SRCS logic (Fig. 3). In this case, the operator is
responsible for the safety of the controlled process in
entirety.
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Fig. 2: Control of the process by the operator – SRCS with
safety functions with higher SIL.
Fig. 3: Control of the process by the operator – SRCS with
safety functions with lower SIL.
3.2. Sequence – Event Model
(Sequence Diagram)
A sequence diagram describes interactions between the
operator, SRCS and the controlled process.
In case of failure less operation of the SRCS (Fig. 4)
a command entered by the operator (Commd) via HMI
is transferred to object realising required safety func-
tion. If it is impossible to threat the safety of the con-
trolled process, logic of the SRCS issues the command
(S_Commd) for the actuator (actuators). This form
of control is marked as o one-stage control.
Fig. 4: Sequence diagram – failure less operation of the SRCS,
one-stage control.
In case of emergency operation using one-stage con-
trol (Fig. 5), the command of the operator does not
checked by the logic of the SRCS. The command is
from HMI transferred directly to the actuator (actua-
tors).
Fig. 5: Sequence diagram – emergency operation, one-stage
control.
In case of multi-stage control (usually double-stage
control), the operator must perform more actions in
exactly defined sequence to command from the opera-
tor be accepted by the logic of the SRCS and then logic
issues the order to change the state of the controlled
process (through actuators control). Block EF checks
correctness of the operator action in issuing the safety
relevant command. Sequence diagram shown in Fig. 6
represents double-stage control principle. The SRCS
logic (the block realized EF) after receiving command
from the operator (T_Commd) backward informs the
operator about required activity and asks the operator
to confirm the command (message Req_Ack). The
EF object subsequently after receiving confirmation
sequence will check its accuracy (comparison of logi-
cal content of the T_Commd and Ack messages) and
issues a command to the actuator (respectively com-
mands to the actuators) [12].
3.3. State-Space Model
Different operational situations of the SRCS and the
controlled process can be represented by the state-
space model (Fig. 7). State space of the controlled
process is generally formed by a set of safe states and a
set of dangerous states (DSP). Safe states are consid-
ered states, in which there is no threat of assets related
to control process (people, property, etc.). Dangerous
states are considered states, in which occurs a treat to
these assets. Similarly the state space of the SRCS is
formed by set of:
• dangerous states (DSS),
• safety states which can be divided concerning of
functionality of the SRCS to:
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– states in which the SRCS is fully functional
(FSS) – the SRCS has no failure,
– states in which the SRCS is partial functional
(P-FSS) – SRCS has failed, thus there are
not available all safety functions; the process
is partially controlled by the operator using
emergency services,
– state in which is the SRCS non-functional (N-
FSS) – the process is fully controlled by the
operator using emergency services.
Fig. 6: Sequence diagram – emergency operation, double-stage
control.
There are exist transitions between these states.
Type of transitions and the intensity of these transi-
tions depend on the specific design of the SRCS and
on the actual controlled process. Transitions between
SRCS state are represented by the dashed line in Fig. 7.
Calculation of the probability (respectively intensity)
of occurrence of the dangerous state of the controlled
process due to SF malfunction is not the main subject
of this paper. For this goal we can use information
specified e.g. in [2], [3], [4], [5].
The most used method which allows analyzing the
influence of multiple factors on the safety of the SRCS
is actually Markov analysis. There can be properly
used combination of Markov’s chains with continuous
time (CTMC) for description of stochastic processes
Fig. 7: State-space model of the SRCS and the controlled pro-
cess.
and Markov’s chains with discrete time (DTMC) for
description of deterministic events, as well as for ap-
proximation of non-homogenous Markov process to ho-
mogenous Markov process [13].
To analyze of the influence of the operator’s error
on the safety of the controlled process we can accept
following assumption: if the SRCS is in dangerous
state, then the controlled process is in dangerous state
too. There is no need to distinguish between danger-
ous state of the SRCS (DSS) and dangerous state of
the controlled process (DSP) and these two states we
can equated. Safe states of the control process are not
relevant in terms of the safety analysis.
The dangerous state of the SRCS (DSS) can occur
due to following hazards:
• failure of the considered safety function,
• error of the operator or HMI when entering
the safety critical commands during normal (no-
failure) operation of the SRCS if the operator con-
trols actuators directly,
• error of the operator or HMI and simultaneous
EF malfunction (if the SRCS disposes of them)
when entering the safety critical commands during
emergency operation of the SRCS.
Following transitions between states in Fig. 7 relate
with hazards bound to the operator error:
• transition between FSS and DSS states; it is the
transition which is applied during no-failure oper-
ation of the SRCS if the operator can control ac-
tuators directly; the intensity of the transition de-
pends on the frequency of issuing such commands
and on the operator error or HMI failure proba-
bility,
• transition between P-FSS and DSS states; it is
the transition which is applied in case of partial
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functional SRCS; transition intensity depends on
applied mode of the emergency control (one-stage
or double stage control), on the operator respec-
tively HMI failure probability and on frequency of
safety critical commands entering,
• transition between states N-FSS and DSS; it is
the transition which is applied in case of the SRCS
malfunction; transition intensity depends on mode
of process controlling by the operator (single-stage
or multi-stage control), on the operator error or
HMI failure probability and on frequency of safety
relevant commands entering (frequency of safety
critical commands entering is higher than in tran-
sition between states P-FSS and DSS).
Safety analysis of the controlled process should be
provided individually for each safety function realized
by the SRCS.
For practical usable of the procedure described in
this paper for safety assessment of the controlled pro-
cess, it is necessary:
• to compile the state-space diagram describing dan-
gerous state occurrence base on good knowledge of
the specific SRCS and the controlled process; com-
piled diagram should respect not only factors in-
fluenced the safety of the SRCS (its architecture,
reliability, diagnostic . . . ), but also the mode of
SRCS operation and the role of the operator in
control of the process,
• to determine the intensities of transitions between
individual states of the model.
Determination of the transitions intensity (especially
of the transitions related to human error and frequency
of issuance of safety critical commands of the operator)
is very difficult. It is necessary to use statistical data
acquired from operation of such systems. Detailed in-
formation regarding human error of the operator and
frequency of the safety critical commands used for con-
trol of the railway transport process were published
in [7].
4. Conclusion
There is established indirect safety assessment of the
controlled process using assessment of the technical
measures (safety assessment of the SRCS) and orga-
nizational measures (among other things, measures to
minimize probability of operator error) applied to elim-
inate the hazards related to the controlled process.
Operator error rate cannot be a quality criterion of
the SRCS. In order to ensure objectivity of the safety
assessment of technical design of the SRCS it is nec-
essary to pay attention to the technical measures de-
signed to eliminate potential operator error in an emer-
gency operation. In this evaluation it is necessary to
consider a nominal value of the HEP (for example sta-
tistically determined value for specific type of the con-
trolled process).
There is not considered intentional threat of the con-
trolled process by the operator in safety assessment
of the process. Design of control systems resistant to
operator bad motives would result in a significant in-
crease of their price and operability reducing of such
system also. Operability reducing would lead to serious
problems in the controlling of processes which running
cannot be interrupted.
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